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I Introduction 
This paper considers how future macro-economic developments in the Irish economy and 
elsewhere are likely to affect the distribution of income and the tax system. In particular it 
examines how 1992 and related developments will affect the scope for using the tax system to 
change the distribution of income. In addition, using the ESRI's macro-economic model it 
explores the extent to which policy on income distribution is likely to be constrained by the 
existing structure of the economy. 
Recent research has told us much about the extent of poverty in Ireland1• However, the 
way forward in terms of tackling the problem is by no means clearcut. While it may appear to 
be a straight forward case of taking resources from the rich and giving them to the poor, in a 
complex modern society this is not a simple operation. Problems arise as changes in taxation 
affect the behaviour of those subject to tax. For example, an increase in tax rates will tend to 
increase unemployment and, therefore, poverty, while the expenditure of the additional revenue 
helps alleviate poverty. A3 a result, the net effect of such policy changes is unclear. 
The fact that income redistribution is not simple in a modern society such as Ireland is no 
excuse for washing one's hands and forgetting about the problem. However, it does mean that 
a wide range of issues must be considered in formulating policy in this. area. Research indicates 
that, in the past, the social welfare system has played a more important role than the tax system 
in changing the distribution of income in Ireland2• However, the tax system also has an important 
role to play, if only in funding the social welfare system. The purpose of this paper is to consider, 
at a macro-economic level, some of the constraints on using the tax system to redistribute income, 
how these constraints can best be overcome, and how the tax system should be developed over 
the next five years to achieve a range of possible social and economic objectives. 
The constraints which we face can be considered under three headings: the external 
environment, domestic policy, and the behaviour of individuals and groups in Irish society. I 
consider how domestic policy can be changed to achieve certain objectives, assuming that past 
behaviour is a good predictor of future behaviour by individual agents in Irish society (e.g. 
consumers, trade unionists, employers, farmers etc.). The feasibility of changing such behaviour 
I leave to politicians and other social scientists and concentrate instead on domestic economic 
policy, especially the tax system, and examine the scope for change in the medium-term. 
Section 2 of this paper briefly summarises the domestic and international economic 
environment which we are likely to face over the next five years. It draws heavily on the research 
in the last ESRI Medium-Term Review. Section 3 examines the Irish tax system in the wider 
European context and it considers how 1992 will require changes in the Irish tax system over 
the next five years. Using the ESRI's Macro-economic model Section 4 looks at the interaction 
of the tax system with the economy and considers how the interaction constrains the use of the 
tax system to achieve major changes in the distribution of income. Finally, in Section 5, I discuss 
changes in the tax system which are both feasible in the economic environment which we face 
over the next five years and which might effect some redistribution of income. 
1 T. Callan, D.F. Hannan, B. Nolan, B.J. Whelan, and S. Creighton, 1988, "Poverty and the Social Welfare Sys-
tem in Ireland", Poverty and the Social Welfare Sysrem in Ireland, No. 1, Combat Poverty Agency. 
2 D.C. Murphy, 1983, "The Impact of State Taxes and Benefits on Irish Household Incomes" ,Journal Of The 
Stalistical And Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, Vol .. XXV, Part I. 
3 J. Bradley and J. Fitz Gerald, 1989,Medium-Term Review: 1989-1994, No. 3, The Economic and Social 
Research Institute. 
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2 The Irish Economy in the Medium-Term 
The ESRI's Medium-Term Review, published in July of this year, forecasted a major 
recovery in the Irish economy over the next five years. The growth rate is forecast to average 
nearly 5 per cent a year over the period to 1994 and there will be a substantial increase in 
employment of over 80,000 people. If realised, this will represent the best performance of the 
Irish economy since the 1960s. 
The Review identified a number of reasons for this tum-round in economic fortunes. 
Firstly, since 1986 there has been a major improvement in the competitive position of the 
Irish economy. Interest rates, after adjusting for inflation, had been higher than in most other 
developed countries since the early 1980s; since 1986 they have fallen in Ireland while they 
have risen in countries such as the UK. Wage costs have nsen more slowly in Ireland than in 
major competitor countries since the mid 1980s. Taken together these improvements have 
resulted in major growth in manufacturing industry. Because industry is slow to react to such 
changes the lagged impact of the improved competitiveness will still affect the manufacturing 
sector over the next few years. 
Secondly, the building industry, which suffered severely from the economic cutbacks and 
recession of the 1980s, has already be_gun to recover. 
Thirdly, and underlying the upturn generally, there is the long awaited improvement in 
the public finances. For much of the 1980s it was necessary to increase taxes and cut expenditure 
to even keep up with the spiralling debt. However, once the comer has been turned, the economy 
enters a virtuous circle. Because deflation is no longer necessary the economy grows more 
rapidly; because the economy grows more rapidly the borrowing requirement falls. We have 
entered this latter phase and, provided the world economy undergos no major traumas and, 
provided we manage the recovery of the Irish economy sensibly, we can look forward to a period 
of stable growth in the medium term. 
While the forecast generally assumes no change in the volume of government expenditure 
(no change in public sector employment) and indexation of tax rates and bands, there are three 
exceptions which reflect the current stance of economic policy. These exceptions relate to income 
tax, transfer payments and capital expenditure. 
Neither the assumption concerning the rate of increase in real welfare payments nor that 
concerning the tax cuts are intended to be normative (i.e. a statement as to what should be done). 
They rather represent an assessment as to what a continuation of currently announced policy 
would represent. As such they give some indication as to what may happen over the next five 
years on current policies and they present a useful benchmark against which to judge the possible 
impact of alternative policies. In the case of public capital expenditure it is assumed that the 
government's National Development Plan is implemented in full. 
The reduction assumed in income tax amounts to 0.66 per cent of personal income each 
year. In 1990 the cost of this concession, compared to pure indexation, would be about £140 
million. For later years the cost would rise in line with inflation. The forecast also assumes that, 
in line with past experience, social welfare transfers rise somewhat faster than the rate of inflation; 
i.e. a real increase of about 1.25% a year. 
The return to a stable and fairly high rate of growth carries major implications for the 
living standards of the community over the next five years. While it is possible that the rising 
tide may lift all boats this need not necessarily happen. While the Review can only give a rough 
indication of likely trends in the distribution of income it does suggest that some groups in 
society will see little of this improvement in living standards. 
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While there will obviously be some differences in the experience of the workforce in 
different sectors of the economy, the Medium-Term Review suggests that these will not be very 
great. For example, the after tax income per person employed in the agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors is forecast to show a similar pattern of growth over the period. After 
deduction of tax and adjustment for inflation, personal income as a whole is forecast to grow 
on average by over 3.75 per cent a year. When allowance is made for the fall in population over 
the period 1988-94, the rise in real after tax income per head is forecast to be over 4 per cent. 
Even with the modest increase in real transfers assumed in the Review, as can be seen in 
Figure 1, the gap between the incomes of those dependent on social welfare transfers and the 
rest of the community will grow•. However, the relative change in rates of payment to those 
dependent on different forms of income is only a very limited indicator of likely changes in the 
distribution of income over the next five years. Changes in numbers in different groups can 
clearly considerably alter the distribution. Thus the proportion of the population which is 
dependent on social welfare payments, in particular the numbers unemployed, will affect the 
distribution in the medium term. 
Figure 1 
COMPARISON OF REAL D.ISPOSABLE INCOME AND REAL TRANSFERS 
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4 This contrasts with the situation between 1980 and 1988 when real transfers per head grew more rapidly than 
real disposable income per head. 
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In the central forecast of the Review it is envisaged that the numbers employed will rise 
by 82,000 over the period to 1994 while the numbers unemployed. will only drop by 37,000 (see 
Figure 2). The difference arises from the fact that the model based forecast indicates that the 
numbers emigrating will be cut drastically over the period. As the domestic labour market 
improves and employment grows, the attractions and possibilities of employment in Ireland will 
reduce net emigration to around 11,000 a year in 1994. In addition, because of the improvement 
in job opportunities around 20,000 to 30,000 people, who are not currently seeking work, will 
take up employment. These two groups, will obviously be major beneficiaries from the recovery. 
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If unemployment were only of short duration, so that most of those experiencing unem-
ployment over the next five years also shared in the benefits accruing to those in employment, 
the long term effects on income distribution would be less clear. However, past experience 
suggests that the long-tenn unemployed will continue to fair badly in spite of the economic 
upturn. Those with skills and education will be more likely to find employment while the 
unskilled long tenn unemployed will see little benefit from the economic recovery. Thus 
unchanged policies could see a relative disimprovement in the position of those dependent on 
transfer payments on a long-tenn basis. 
As the Review suggests the economic tum-round over the next five years provides scope 
for changing current policy. While the imperative of controlling the public debt has driven policy 
over much of the 1980s more choice will be available in the 1990s. In the short-term the Review 
forecasts that there will be serious danger of domestically induced inflation over the next two 
years which wiII necessitate a continuation of fairly stringent fiscal policy and possible move-
ment of the public sector into surplus in 1991. Failure to choke off such pressures could seriously 
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prejudice employment growth in the medium-term. Thus while it may seem perverse to be 
recommending that the exchequer run a surplus in 1991 in the face of continuing high unem-
ployment, failure to do so could lead to more unemployed and more people living in pcverty in 
the long-term. Because of this danger it may be necessary to postpone even the limited tax 
reduction assumed in the Review until 1991 or 1992. 
The fact that fiscal policy will have to remain tough in 1990, and possibly in 1991, does 
not mean that progress can not be made in reforming the tax system. In fact, as indicated in the 
Review, tax reform could contribute to easing the inflationary pressures in certain sectors of the 
economy. It could also begin the task of improving the long-term efficiency of the economy 
while, at the same time, changing the distribution of income in a desirable direction. This matter 
is dealt with later in the paper. What the fiscal policy constraint means is that expenditure and 
taxation can be changed but that the size of these changes must be matched so that the borrowing 
requirement continues to fall. 
However, once these inflationary problems come under control in 1992 or 1993 it will be 
possible to use some of the increasing resources accruing to the state to improve services or cut 
taxation. Real choices will be once again possible. The next section considers how these choices 
will be circumscribed by developments in the other European economies and Section 4 considers 
the domestic limitations on policy. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the scenario presented here is only a forecast. The Review 
indicates a range of different factors which could result in slower economic growth in the medium 
term. In particular, any world financial upheaval could be extremely serious because ofireland's 
exposure, through its foreign debts, to a rise in world interest rates. Through raising unem-
ployment it could seriously affect the position of the poor while the government would be limited 
in its room for manoeuvre. The need to reduce such exposure to foreign crises and increase the 
government's ability to insulate the domestic community, especially the poor, lies behind the 
long-term objective of reducing our foreign indebtedness. 
3 The External Environment 
An important consideration in determining the structure of the Irish tax system and the 
level of taxation is the external environment in which the economy operates. It is not that other 
countries know what is best in the area of taxation, or that what is best for other countries is 
necessarily best for Ireland. Rather, the importance of the external environment arises from the 
openness of the Irish economy. Whether we like it or not, the fact that trade accounts for so 
much of our output; that Irish people are free to migrate (and frequently do); the fact that Irish 
people can drive across a border i~to the North and shop; all these mean that we can not determine 
our tax structure independently of other countries. Independence can only be gained by ending 
these freedoms and, as such, is not an option. This section considers what restrictions the external 
environment places on our freedom of action to-day and how the situation is likely to develop 
over the next five years with the advent of 1992. 
The interdependence of the Irish and the EC economies operates at two levels. Firstly, at 
a macro-economic level, we can not stimulate our economy by borrowing and cutting taxation 
unless other countries follow suit. The debacle of the 1970s taught us that. The same lesson has 
had to be learnt over the last ten years by other much more closed economies such as France, 
the UK and the USA. 
The way that our international interdependence operates at a micro-economic level in 
terms of individual tax rates is much more complex. It also differs from tax to tax. The extent 
of our freedom to act independently depends, essentially, on the extent to which the person who 
eventually pays the relevant tax can escape it through moving abroad. In the case of taxes where 
such freedom is easily exercised we, perforce, must follow reasonably closely what happens 
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elsewhere, even if it is not socially desirable. To do otherwise will impose social and economic 
costs which would outweigh the benefits of independent action. Freedom in such cases is more 
easily exercised if one wants to charge a lower rate of tax, not a higher. 
A first step to evaluating the extent of our independence is to examine the difference in 
tax structures across the EC member states. What other countries do would not necessarily even 
be the best solution fora closed Irish economy (which does not exist) but it does set the parameters 
in which we can determine our own tax policy. 
3,1 Comparison of EC Tax Systems 
Figure 3 sets out a comparison of tax revenue as a percentage of GDP in the different EC 
members in 1987. As can be seen from this Figure, in 1987 Ireland was around the middle of 
the range of EC members with tax revenue accounting for just under 40% of GDP. The newer 
member states and Italy had significantly lower overall tax levels and the UK and Germany 
were around 2 percentage points below the Irish level. However, it could be argued that Ireland 
has an unusually high tax level for its standard of living. By 1994 the Medium-Term Review 
shows the tax/GDP ratio in Ireland falling to 37.4%. 
Figure 3 
TAX REVENUE AS% OF GDP 
There is considerable variation in the composition of total tax revenue across the EC 
member states. As shown in Table 1, within the EC only Portugal, Greece and Italy pay a 
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significantly lower proportion of GNP in direct taxes5 than does Ireland. Both the UK and Spain 
collect approximately the same proportion of GDP in direct taxation as does Ireland and the 
other member states collect substantially higher shares. 
Total 
Ireland 39.9 
Belgium 45.4 
Denmark 51.8 
France 44.7 
Germany 37.6 
Greece 36.7 
Italy' 36.2 
Luxembourg 42.4 
Netherlands 47.3 
Portugal' 32.4 
Spain 32.8 
UK 38.0 
* 1986 data 
Table 1: Taxation as % of GDP 
Comparison of Ireland and other EC countries 1987 
Income Companies Income Social Direct Property 
+ Security 
Companies 
14.1 1.4 15.5 6.1 21.6 1.1 
15.3 3.0 18.3 15.3 33.6 0.8 
27.1 2.3 29.4 2.1 31.5 2.6 
5.8 2.3 8.1 20.0 28.1 2.1 
10.9 1.9 12.8 14.0 26.8 1.2 
5.0 1.4 6.4 12.6 19.0 1.0 
10.8 2.9 13.7 12.6 26.3 1.0 
11.2 7.1 18.3 11.1 29.4 2.6 
9.5 3.7 13.2 19.7 32.9 1.7 
6.9 NA 6.9 9.1 16.0 0.6 
7.5 2.3 9.8 12.0 21.8 1.0 
10.1 4.0 14.1 7.0 21.1 5.0 
Goods Other 
&: 
Services 
17.2 0.0 
10.9 0.1 
17.6 0.1 
13.1 1.4 
9.6 0.0 
16.7 0.0 
8.9 0.0 
10.4 0.0 
125 0.2 
15.6 0.2 
9.8 0.2 
11.9 0.0 
Direct taxation can be broken down into income tax, social security (or pay-roll) taxes 
and company taxes. In Ireland income taxes account for a relatively large share of GDP while 
social security taxes have a below average share. Company taxation generally accounts for a 
relatively small share of GDP with Ireland falling at the bottom of the range6• 
It is in the area of indirect taxation that Ireland stands out from the bulk of other members 
of the EC. Only Denmark collects a higher share of GDP in the form of indirect taxation than 
Ireland and the proportion collected by most other members is well below that in Ireland. 
Five EC members place significantly greater reliance on property taxes as a source of 
revenue than does Ireland. 
3.2 Implications for Irish Tax System 
These data on the share of different taxes in GDP provide useful background in examining 
the external forces affecting the Irish tax system. However, they do not tell us how the Irish tax 
system should or could change over time. Their significance for Ireland depends on the extent 
to which the Irish economy is open to the outside world. This will determine the extent to which 
we have to follow the example of other EC members. 
S Including social security contributions. 
6 In France the bulk of the other taxation is levied on businesses so that all business taxes taken together 
account for between 3 and 4 per cent of GDP. 
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In the case of taxes on the income accruing from financial assets there is very great potential 
mobility of the tax base. Even with exchange control there was extensive movement of capital 
into and out of Ireland. The introduction of the DIRT tax in Ireland was accompanied by a 
sizeable increase in non-resident deposits in the Irish tax system probably arising from a desire 
(and an ability) to evade the tax by nominally shifting jurisdiction. In Germany, the prospect of 
the introduction at the beginning of 1989 of a tax, like our deposit interest retention tax, led to 
such an outflow of hot money from Germany in 1988 that the tax was withdrawn. 
This highlights the problem facing member states of the EC in acting alone in this area. 
In the future, with the ending of all restrictions on the movement of capital, it will be important 
to reach some agreement on taxation in this area. Otherwise major new distortions may be 
introduced as it becomes profitable for owners of substantial investment funds to evade tax by 
moving them to low tax or zero tax environments. Unfortunately current EC Commission 
proposals for harmonisation in this area look like foundering on the rock of UK and Luxembourg 
resistance. 
The failure to introduce a coordinated approach to this area of taxation has adverse 
implications for the use of tax policy to redistribute income. Holders of wealth in the form of 
financial assets probably tend to be better off than the average tax-payer. The fact that they can 
evade or avoid tax on the inco.me from these financial assets is clearly regressive. 
Indirect taxation, levied on goods which are generally fairly mobile, is also an area where 
foreign tax regimes impinge on Ireland and our choice of tax rate. This area is currently much 
in the news because of the proposals for 1992. 
The fact that Indirect taxes are higher in Ireland than in most other member states of the 
EC has been discussed above. The reasons for the difference arise partly from the need to raise 
revenue and partly from a perception that consumption of certain goods, such as alcohol and 
tobacco, should be discouraged. There is a movement in other countries, especially Denmark 
and Germany, to raise taxes on energy for environmental reasons. These differences in tax policy 
reflect differences in national preferences and priorities. Because of these differences in pref-
erences, a harmonised indirect tax system will only be optimal in very limited circumstances 7 
However, even with existing controls on the movement of goods the differences in tax 
rates have led to substantial cross-border shopping and large scale smuggling8• This has in the 
past necessitated some changes in the Irish tax system to bring it more into line with the UK. 
For example, in 1985 excise tax on spirits was reduced to stem the flow of alcohol from the 
North. I deal with the full implications of 1992 and the abolition of border controls below. 
In the case of company taxation, the policy adopted in the 1950s, and maintained since 
then, has been to exploit the integrated nature of the world economy and attract business to 
Ireland by charging a lower rate of tax on profits than that charged in many other countries. As 
a result, it is not surprising that revenue from this source accounts for a lower than average share 
of GDP in Ireland and, as a result, there is more freedom, if desired, to increase taxation in this 
area. However, as the tax rate on manufacturing industry is raised, at some point there will be 
some loss of incentive for firms to locate in Ireland. 
7 M. Keen, 1989, "Pareto-Improving Indirect Tax Harmonisation", European Economic Review, Vol. 33, No. 1, 
January. 
8 Sec Fitz Gerald, J.D., T.P.Quinn, BJ.Whelan, and J.A. Williams, 1988. An Analysis ofCross,Border Shopp· 
ing, ESRI General Research series No. 137. 
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In the case of income taxes and pay-roll taxes the sustainabilit.Y or otherwise of the current 
Irish tax system depends on a range of factors. It depends on the. mcidence of the tax. To the 
extent that it falls on employees rather than employers it will not affect the competitiveness of 
industry and services and should not affect the demand for labour. However, if the tax results 
in higher waie settlements, passing back some of the cost to the employer, the employer may 
shift production to an alternative cheaper location outside Ireland. In such a case part of the cost 
of the tax would be borne by those made unemployed through the shifting of output abroad. 
Thus changes in direct tax rates in competing countries, such as in Ireland and its EC 
partners, can affect the level of output in individual countries if some of the incidence of the tax 
falls on business through higher pay costs. This constraint can be quite serious and is discussed 
in more detail in the next section. 
Even if all the incidence of the direct taxes falls on employees there may be effects on the 
economy through the supply side of the labour market (affecting the willingness of P.eople to 
work in Ireland). This supply effect may be enhanced to the extent that there is a possibility for 
workers to obtain employment in different countries. Because of the integration of the Irish 
labour market into that of the UK the importance of direct tax rates in the UK in affecting the 
supply of labour in Ireland may be greater than in the case of most other EC members. 
The importance of this effect has not been quantified. It depends on how sensitive migration 
is to the rates of return in different labour markets. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it has had 
an effect in encouraging young skilled workers to leave Ireland and seek work in the UK in 
recent years. However, the impact of this emigration on the Irish economy is not easily quantified. 
While the possibility exists for people to avoid paying Irish tax by emigrating, many more 
factors affect such a decision than current differences in rates of income tax. The standard of 
living enjoyable in different countries is also affected by the standard of services and many more 
intangible or unquantifiable items. Thus for the bulk of people ~uite significant differences can 
exist between rates of direct taxation in neighbouring countries without causing significant 
migration. While there may be some effect on the behaviour of specific groups, such as young 
skilled workers, our freedom to determine our own system of direct taxation is much greater 
than is the case for indirect taxation. 
The final area of taxation to be considered is property taxation. In a sense fixed property, 
such as houses and land, is the most immobile of all tax bases. As such, the restrictions on our 
freedom of action arising from differences in tax policy compared to neighbouring EC members 
are likely to be minimal. In addition, as a country charging very low rates of tax on property, 
we have considerable scope for increasing these rates. 
Overall our freedom of action on the taxation of income from capital is affected by 
developments elsewhere. In the case of indirect taxation there is already pressure to reduce rates 
due to the fact that our rates are well above those charged elsewhere. In the case of direct taxation, 
including company taxation, and property taxes, the international environment leaves us some 
scope to either reduce or increase rates in accordance with our own preferences or economic or 
social needs. 
3.3 The Impact of 1992. 
The advent of 1992 may potentially affect our tax system in three areas: taxes on income 
from capital; indirect taxes; company taxation. The changes which it may bring are part of the 
ongoing process, described above, of the growing interdependence of developed economies. 
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In the area of the taxation of income from capital Ireland, like most other EC members, 
faces problems from the growing freedom for capital to move freely within the EC (and outside 
it). Unless changes are made to coordinate taxation in this area, or reporting to national tax 
authorities, we may find the tax base for DIRT eroded. If coordination 1s successful, along the 
lines suggested by the EC Commission last year, we could find our tax base increased and 
revenue from this source of taxation increased. Developments in this area will also affect the 
taxation of the investment income of financial institutions which currently pay little tax in Ireland. 
It is difficult to know what will be the final outcome of the current EC wide debate on this area 
of taxation. 
All the evidence suggests that if customs barriers are to be completely dismantled at the 
end of 1992 there will have to be a much greater harmonisation of indirect taxes across the EC9• 
The precise nature of the harmonisation remains to be determined. If the original EC Commission 
proposals were implemented it would mean the imposition of VAT on food while excise taxes, 
especially on alcohol, would be drastically cut. The effects of such a change on the distribution 
of income could be adverse. However, the effects on individuals and families would depend 
very much on the importance of alcohol in the individual household budget: 
Such a change in taxation could also give rise to problems within families. To the extent 
that the purchase of food and other household goods is undertaken by one partner in a family 
out of a fixed budget, while the other partner spends a significant amount on alcohol, the tax 
change could affect the distribution of resources within such families. It would require an increase 
in the food budget and a reduction in the household's alcohol budget. Because we know little 
about the pattern of budgeting within families it is difficult to say what the effects of such a 
change in tax would be on members of individual families. However, it is likely that if rates of 
indirect taxation underwent drastic change in any one year it could cause significant problems. 
However, the EC Commission appear to be moving away from their original proposals 
though it is not clear what will be the eventual agreement within the EC. Whatever the end 
result, it is certain that it will involve a significant loss of revenue for the Irish exchequer. The 
Department of Finance are currently talking about a loss of over £600 million or around 3 
percentage points of GDP. Clearly this will have major implications for the development of the 
Irish tax system in the next five years. 
While the EC Commission in their White Paper10 of 1986 sought a harmonisation of 
corporate tax systems as part of the preparations for 1992, little progress has been made since 
then. Even if this issue is pursued in the next few years it is certain that the existing low corporate 
tax rate in Ireland will be allowed to the end of the century. 
However, it might be in Ireland's interest to encourage a greater harmonisation of corporate 
tax regimes in Europe. If all tax systems, with the exception of the Irish 10% rate, were levelled 
upwards by eliminating all other special write-offs, it could enhance the attractiveness of Ireland 
by ending wasteful competition on incentives between member states of the EC. It would also 
raise the revenue from this source of taxation in Ireland and elsewhere. Whether or not such 
coordination takes place in the future, as a country charging low taxes on companies, we still 
have considerable freedom of action to vary our company tax structure. · 
4 The Tax System and the Economy 
As in all developed economies there is a very complex set of relationships between the 
tax system and the distribution of income. The economy never stands still to allow one to make 
9 Fitz Gerald J., 1989. "The Distonionary Effects of Taxes on Trade in Border Areas: The Case of the Republic 
of Ireland - United Kingdom Border", ESRI Memorandum Series No. 183. 
10 European Commission, 1985. Completing the Internal Market, June. 
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marginal changes in taxes. Any significant change in taxes will set in train a complex chain of 
events which will indirectly affect all aspects of the economy. If the economy would only stand 
still it would be a relatively straightforward exercise to work out the income distribution effects 
of, for example, a change in income tax bands. However, people react to tax changes by changing 
their behaviour. They may well be able to pass on some of the costs (or lose some of the benefits) 
of any tax chan~e to other individuals or companies. While, as discussed above, the openness 
of an economy increases the magnitude of the possible indirect effects of tax changes, even in 
a closed economy such effects are very import ant. 
For example, a cut in the rate of income tax costing £100 million might be expected to 
raise personal disposable income by that amount. However, as after tax income rises the demand 
for higher wages may ease, increasing profits. In other words some of the benefits may accrue 
to companies. Companies may in turn react by expanding and employing more people or they 
may compete, driving down prices, and pass in~ the benefits on to consumers. Thus the benefits 
of a tax cut could be shared by the initial recipients, companies and their owners, those who 
find employment in the newly created jobs, and consumers. These indirect or dynamic effects 
of changes in tax rates may be very important in changing the distribution of income. 
Changes in income taxation ( or pay-roll taxes) affect the disposable income of the personal 
sector in the economy. They also cause individuals and groups in the personal sector to change 
their attitude to bargaining for wage increases. Using a macro-economic model we can examine 
these effects at an aggregate level. 
Changes in company taxation will affect companies behaviour. It will affect whether they 
choose to produce in Ireland or elsewhere. Depending on how the tax is levied it may also affect 
the amount of capital they use in production and the number of people they will choose to employ 
in Ireland. For example, extensive incentives to invest make it cheaper to replace employees 
with machines in the production process. 
Indirect tax changes will firstly affect prices and, through them, the spending power of 
individual incomes. For example, a cut in the tax on alcohol might be partly absorbed into higher 
profits by manufacturers and partly passed on to consumers in lower prices. To the extent that 
it is passed on to consumers the spending power of their incomes will be raised 11. This in turn 
will lead to higher consumption. Such a tax cut would also affect the proportion of income that 
goes on alcohol. A cut in the price of alcohol could be expected to lead to a rise in alcohol 
consumption. If the cut in the price of alcohol were compensated for by a rise in the price of 
food then the consumption of food might fall. Depending on the proportion of food and alcohol 
respectively which are imported this change could affect domestic output and employment. 
Thus the issues which need to be considered in arriving at the economic and income 
distribution effects of tax changes are the incidence ofany particular tax -who pays it (or benefits 
from it), and how those affected by it react to the change. In this Section I consider only the 
macro-economic effects of changes in taxation. More detailed micro-economic research is 
needed to answer the many questions which arise concerning the effects on individual workers, 
consumers etc. 
In this Section I have used the ESRI HERMES macro-economic model 12 to examine the 
impact of a change in income tax costing £125 million as well as a change in social welfare 
payments of £100 million financed by a rise in income taxes. (The ex-ante increase in income 
tax has to be greater than that in transfers to ensure self-financing.) 
11 lt is estimated that about 80% of the benefits are passed throul!h to consumers. See Bradley J., J. Fitz Gerald, 
D. Hurley, L. O'Sullivan and A. Storey, 1989. HERMES-Irelan£ The EC Medium-Term Pohcy Model of the 
Irish Economy: Structure and Performance, forthcoming, ESRI. 
12 ibid. 
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This model takes account of the reaction of employees to changes in their after tax incomes; 
the reaction ofcompanies to changes in profitability; the effects of changes in income on spending 
and domestic demand; and the effect of changes in borrowing on government debt and interest 
payments. 
4.1 Change in Income Tax 
Using the model the effects of raising revenue from income tax by £125 million are 
examined. The change is assumed to take place in 1990 and revenue is held above its benchmark 
level by a fixed £125 million indefinitely. (The results would be similar in magnitude, though 
with opposite signs, if taxes were cut by £125 million.) This shows what the effects would be 
of a tax increase (or failing to reduce taxes). In this simulation it is assumed that the revenue 
raised is used to repay debt. 
As can be seen in Figure 4, the first effect of the tax increase is that employees seek to 
offset their losses by raising wage rates. In 1990 wage rates would rise by 0.58 per cent more 
than they would have without such a shock. By 1991 the level of wage rates would be 0.67 per 
cent above the benchmark. The rise in wage rates feeds into prices of home produced goods 
raising the price level by 0.36 per cent in 1990. Of course this feeds back into wages. 
The effect of the rise in wage rates is to cut industrial profitability and to reduce compe-
titiveness. As shown in Figure 5, the level of industrial output falls by 0.31 per cent and industrial 
employment falls initially by almost 250 (0.08% ). However, as firms adjust to the changed 
competitiveness the job losses increase to around 1,300 (0.4%) in industry in 1994. There are 
also significant job losses in the services sector as demand falls due to the tax increase. By 1994 
total employment is reduced by around 3,000. 
The effects on GDP and GNP are rather different. Figure 6 shows how GDP is reduced 
permanently by 0.33 per cent while GNP in 1994 is reduced by 0.23 per cent. The difference is 
due to the fact that the repayment of debt reduces foreign debt interest payments and the reduction 
in industrial profits reduces profit repatriations. In the very long run (i.e. 20 years) GNP is 
actually raised by the tax increase as the saving on foreign interest payments cumulates. 
What this simulation highlights is the fact that raising taxes, or failing to reduce them, 
reduces competitiveness and, therefore, employment. This cost must be offset against the benefits 
which accrue from the spending of the increased revenue. In this example the revenue is invested 
in debt repayment. 
4.2 Tax Increase Offset by Increase in Transfers 
In a second simulation the effects of a simultaneous sustained increase in welfare payments 
amounting to £100 million financed by raising income taxes was examined. Because of the loss 
in revenue from other taxes and higher expenditure from an increase in unemployment it would 
be necessary to raise revenue from income tax by around £125 million to ensure that there was 
no net exchequer cost from the package (i.e. no change in the Exchequer borrowing requirement). 
While the increase in·transfer payments offsets the demand effects of the tax increase it 
does not offset the negative impact on competitiveness so that the volume of GDP falls by 0.13% 
by 1994 (Figure 7). The employees who pay the taxes continue to seek higher wage rates in 
spite of the fact that the higher taxes are used to fund higher transfers (Figure 8). The effect of 
this assymetry is to reduce industrial employment by 1,200 (0.37%) and industrial output by 
0.24 per cent by 1994 (Figure 9). 
In terms of the effects on the distribution of income the transfer of resources from income 
tax-payers to social welfare recipients would be bought at the cost of 1,500 less jobs in the 
economy as a whole. Some of those affected by the job loss would emigrate while some of them 
would add to the dole queues. There would also be adverse effects for those not in a position to 
partially offset the rise in prices by raising their nominal incomes. The rise in prices also reduces 
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the value of the increase in welfare payments to something over £80 million in real terms. In 
weighing up the effects of such a policy change the adverse dynamic effects arising from the 
loss of employment and higher prices must be offset against the redistribution of income 
achieved. 
This exercise is intended to illustrate the problems facing policy makers in this area and 
the magnitudes and timing of the effects could be very different in practice. What it does show 
· is the importance of the reactions of those liable to changes in taxes in determining the economic 
effects. If income tax payers were to embrace with open arms a tax increase and not seek rec-
ompense for loss ofpurchasin~ power through higher pay, then the results could be very different. 
However, past experience indicates that the model is a reasonable representation of the behaviour 
of the Irish economy over the last 20 years. 
4.3 Other Effects 
While the model has allowed for some of the possible reaction of tax-payers, it has, per-
force, to treat the matter at a very aggregate level. The tax increase simulated is very stylised 
and does not take account of detailed labour market effects. For example, if the tax increase 
occurred through a reduction in allowances it would reduce the difference between working and 
being unemployed which could increase the adverse effects on empfoyment of the change. 
Alternatively, if levied on returns from institutional savings (such as life assurance funds) it 
might be less likely to lead to higher prices and pay rates and, as a result, have less adverse 
employment effects than shown in the above simulations. 
The model used here is not sufficient! y sensitive to differentiate between the dynamic 
effects of different kinds of taxes. Thus alternative evidence must be used in considering whether 
changes in taxation should be effected by changing income tax, social welfare contributions, 
indirect taxes, company taxes or property taxes. 
5 Conclusions 
So far this paper has concentrated on the constraints, current and future, domestic and 
foreign, which limit our freedom to use the tax system to redistribute income: However, some 
of these constraints are not necessarily binding. In other cases the direction in which we are 
being pushed is the route we might want to travel. It is still possible to make significant changes 
in the distribution of income by means of the tax system. While some of the changes will have 
social and economic costs, these costs may be an acceptable price to pay for the redistribution 
achieved. In other cases, changes in the tax system which are desirable for economic reasons 
may result in a significant redistribution of income. 
The tax system is only one aspect of a complex set of policies which together alter the 
distribution of income. While this paper concentrates on the role of the tax system, it must be 
clearly understood that the tax system alone can not achieve a major redistribution of income. 
However, it is equally true that it must be part of any policy of redistribution. This concluding 
Section discusses a range of tax reform measures which would have minimum undesirable side 
effects (or might even have additional benefits) and which would tend to redistribute income. 
However, without measures to deal with the problems of the long-term unemployed and without 
reform of the social welfare system these tax changes will not be very effective. As such, this 
Section does not set out a fully integrated programme of changes but rather gives a number of 
suggestions as to the direction in which the tax system should be changed. These changes broadly 
follow the spirit of the Commission on Taxation. Their effect would be to somewhat reduce the 
overall burden of taxation in the next five years. 
The parameters within which any changes in the tax system in the medium-term must be 
framed are: 
1. There is scope for, at most, a very limited cut in tax revenue in 1990 and 1991. 
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2. Once the current inflationary pressures ease, probably from 1992 onwards, there will probably 
be scope for some further cuts in tax revenue and/or increases in expenditure. 
3. 1992 will necessitate a shift from current indirect taxes to other taxes in the medium term. 
Any proposals for tax changes must take account of the need to fund the changes in indirect 
taxes which 1992 will necessitate. While the cost of the eventual package which may be agreed 
may fall below £600 million, it is likely that there will be a fall in revenue of between 2% and 
3% of GNP to be made good. The original EC Commission proposals involved an extension of 
VAT to food. Taken on its own this change would adversely affect poor families. However, it 
is still not clear if this change will take place in the face of UK opposition. 
Uncertainty about the nature of the final package to be agreed and the wide range of 
changes which it will involve makes the income distribution effects of the package less certain. 
However, if VAT does go on food, even if benefits are raised to compensate those on social 
welfare, these benefits will not compensate those at work on low rates of pay. The final effect 
of this EC indirect tax package, while generally reducing the tax burden, will probably be adverse 
in terms of the distribution of income. Much will depend on how the lost revenue is made good. 
Research for lreland13 indicates that considerable efficiency gains could be obtained by 
using the imposition of a property tax. to fund a reduction in other taxes. A property tax has a 
number of economic advantages in addition to those quoted by Honohan and Irvine. Because 
of the immobility of the base, it will cause a minimum of distortion post 1992. Once set up, it 
is difficult to evade; houses are easy to detect! Initial problems in terms of compliance may be 
got round by collecting the revenue through the existing income tax system. While evidence is 
not at present available on the distribution of personal property holding by income, it can be 
assumed that these two measures of welfare are correlated and such a tax is likely to be pro-
gressive. This effect can be strengthened if provisions are made for exempting low income 
households1'. . · 
This tax could bring in over £300 million. (Depending on the treatment of mortgage interest 
relief in the income tax system, it might be necessary to make allowance for mortgages in 
calculating liability from property tax.) If household rates had been maintained at their real 1977 
level they would to-day be bringing in over £200 million. The proceeds of this extension of the 
tax base should be wholly devoted to reforming the income tax system. 
In the case of income tax the Commission on Taxation recommended that all income, 
whatever the source, should be brought into the tax net. This would involve the taxation of 
capital transfers and capital gains as income; of lump sum payments made as part of retirement 
or redundancy deals; of income from short term social welfare benefits; of children's allowances; 
the ending of the BES scheme; the ending of the Section 23 provisions on rental income. Existing 
tax reliefs on life assurance premia and health insurance premia should be abolished. 
Tax free allowances should be converted to non-payable15 tax credits. The difference 
between tax credits and the current tax free allowances is that credits would be worth the same 
to tax-payers whatever their income whereas tax free allowances are worth most to those in the 
highest tax brackets. 
13 Honohan, P. and I. Irvine, 1987. "The Marginal Social Cost of Taxation in Ireland", The Economic and 
Social Review, Vol. 19 No.l. 
14 The interaction of such exemptions with the inco·me tax and social welfare systems would have to be taken 
into account to avoid unintentionally high effective marginal tax rates, as emphasised in Nolan B., T. Callan. 
1989. Direct Taxation and the Poor in Ireland, paper presented to this conference. 
15 If the tax credit is greater than the tax liability no refund is made. 
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The savings from these changes, from the introduction of a property tax, and the changes 
in company taxation, suggested below, would provide a substantial budget for tax reform. The 
question then arises as to bow this budget should best be spent in changing the tax system. It 
would simultaneously permit a major reduction in marginal tax rates and the implementation 
of a wide range of possible objectives on the distribution of income. 
Work in the UK16 indicates that marginal tax rates could affect behaviour of those on the 
margins of the labour force, generally with low earning potential. This would argue on economic 
efficiency grounds for usin~ some of the money to remove a substantial number of low income 
tax payers from the tax net . The evidence in Callan, Hannan, Nolan, Whelan, and Creighton, 
1988, indicates that some of those living in poverty are paying tax so that such a change would 
also have positive redistribution effects. It would also go some way to compensating those on . 
low incomes for the adverse effects of any increase in VAT on food. Finally, it would tend to 
reduce pressure for increases in wage rates, helping to increase the numbers employed in the 
longer term. 
Some of the budget would also have to go to reducing the marginal rate of tax for tax-payers 
on higher tax bands. The tax package would also tend to benefit young skilled workers on 
relatively high starting salaries who tend not to be major property owners. They would benefit 
from a reduction in marginiil tax rates while escaping the property tax liability. This should, if 
anything, reduce the incentive for such skilled workers to emigrate. 
The centre-piece of Irish industrial policy since the 1950s has been the reduced or zero 
rate of corporation tax. This has been a major factor underlying the relatively small share of 
GDP collected from the company sector in Ireland. The Irish industrial sector has evolved over 
a long period around this policy. As a result, it would not be possible, to change this aspect of 
the Irish tax system for existing firms before the end of the century without dislocation. 
In the light of the unsatisfactory results achieved by this policy in the past18, it is indeed 
surprising to see it now being applied to the financial services sector through the special 
provisions for firms locating in the Customs House Docks. This provision is contrary to the 
approach of the Commission on Taxation and the recommendations of many economists con-
cerning such an approach when applied to industrial policy. Unless the vast bulk of business 
availing of this provision is new business from abroad there is a grave danger that a further 
significant chunk of our corporate tax base will disappear into a blue lagoon on the Liffey. Even 
if there is an extensive take up by foreign financial service firms the net benefits to the Irish 
economy may well be very small, given that this business will be founded on the basis of transfer 
pricing and profit repatriations. 
The combination of the dual rate corporate tax system and the generous provision ofcapital 
allowances has, over time, given rise to a range of distortions and loopholes, substantially 
reducing the revenue from corporate taxes. The growth of leasing and Section 84 loans has 
allowed the financial sector to share in the benefits of the low industrial tax rate, at substantial 
cost to the exchequer. In other countries in the 1980s there has been a move towards a simpler 
corporate tax structure with somewhat lower tax rates but higher tax yields arising from an 
elimination or reduction in allowances. 
16 Murphy, A., 1987. "Taxation, Labour Supply, Employment and Unemployment", Paper given to a Confer-
ence organised by the Foundation for Fiscal Studies, September. 
17 or, possibly, to change the social insurance system. 
18 Ruane, F., 1983. "Industrial Development", Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, 
Vol. XXIV, 1982/3. National Economic and Social Council, 1982, Report No. 64 and 1986, Report No. 83. 
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' What is needed is a reform of the corporate tax system along the lines originally suggested 
by the Commission on Taxation. This would result in an increase in revenue from this source 
of tax bringing Ireland closer to the practice of all our EC partners. Such a change would, in the 
long run, affect the investment income of the owners of the company sector. 
The taxation of investment income (e.g. of life assurance com~anies) remains a major 
problem area. In an earlier paper I showed that the amount of tax paid on such incomes was 
very low19• However, as indicated above in Section 3, the openness of the Irish economy poses 
some limitation on independent action in this area of taxation. While it would obviously be 
preferable to see an EC wide approach to this problem it is still possible to take some independent 
action to ensure a more equitable level of tax revenue. The current beneficiaries from this 
loophole in the tax system are the owners of life assurance policies and members of pension 
funds. It is likely that the effect on the distribution of income of a reform in this area of taxation 
would be progressive. 
The range of tax changes set out above is not a menu from which one can choose at will 
to achieve a desired distribution of income. They must be combined carefully to ensure that 
their interaction does not produce unexpected and undesirable economic or income distribution 
effects. As indicated earlier in the paper, policy makers face major constraints on their freedom 
ofaction. To the extent that these constraints stem from the openness of the economy the solution 
must lie at the EC level. To the extent that they arise from economic behaviour, such as the 
reaction of tax-payers to taxes, they are technically within the control of the community. 
However, experience suggests that the reaction of tax-payers to tax changes which hurt them is 
usually adverse. They try and recoup their loss through higher wage demands or higher prices. 
This paper shows that redistribution of income through the tax system may have significant 
economic costs. However, given the existing structure of the Irish tax system, it is possible to 
reform it in such a way as to minimise or even reduce these costs while, at the same time, 
achieving some change in the burden of taxation. 
19 Fitz Gerald, J., 1988. "Proposals for Reform", paper presented to the Foundation for Fi.seal Studies pre-
budget conference, 21-1-1988. 
